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Introduction
In 2015, a group of hackers known as “Impact Team” targeted Ashley Madison,
an online dating service that openly facilitated extra-marital affairs. The hackers took
issue with the website and demanded its immediate termination. When Ashley Madison
refused to discontinue operations, “Impact Team” defaced their website, breached their
database, and publicly released the names of their subscribers (Hackathorn et al. 2017).
As exemplified by this attack, website defacement, or the replacement of a website’s
original content with one’s own content, is a relatively simple form of hacking with
potentially severe consequences (Holt 2009, 2012). Although hackers have found
numerous ways to deface websites, with varying degrees of complexity, the most
common method is via SQL injection (Trend Micro 2019). 1 Although over one million
websites are defaced each year (Zone-H 2018), only a few criminological studies exist
that have studied website defacement as a form of cybercrime (i.e. Holt et al. 2017; Holt
et al. 2019; Maimon et al. 2017).
We suspect that criminological research into the causes and correlates of website
defacement is currently limited for two main reasons. First, most criminologists are
unfamiliar with computer technology or the cyber-environment (Maimon and
Louderback 2019). Therefore, the discipline avoids studying cybercrime generally.
Second, those who do study cybercrime struggle to find valid and reliable data sources.
This is in part because most hackers hide their identity and erase evidence of their
intrusion (Howell et al. 2017); thus, official data sources like the FBI’s Internet Crime
Complaint Center probably underreport incidents of cybercrime.
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SQL (Structured Query Language) injection is a hacking technique involving malicious code entered into
a web page through the site’s input fields.

Some scholars, however, have started using original data collection techniques to
overcome these issues, and garner insight into the correlates of website defacement. For
example, Holt et al. (2017) examined the attitudinal and behavioral correlates of engaging
in website defacement and found that political attitudes towards marginalized groups are
associated with an increased willingness to engage in website defacement. Similarly, Holt
and colleagues (2019), using a qualitative methodological approach, found that far-left
extremist groups deface websites for the same political reasons they engage in physical
crimes. Lastly, Maimon and colleagues (2017), using data they gathered from various
social media platforms, found that hackers’ social media use increases their attack
frequency. Although these studies certainly provide valuable insight, the correlates of
website defacement victimization are still unknown. If website hosts are unaware of the
risk factors associated with victimization, they cannot effectively mitigate attack
frequency.
The current study seeks to address this gap in the literature. By taking advantage
of a unique online dataset compiled by Zone-H, which includes website defacers’ reports
of their malicious activities against websites hosted by servers all over the world, we
focus on understanding how countries’ structural factors correlate with the volume of
website defacements. To date, we know of no study examining the relationship between a
country’s Internet infrastructure and socioeconomic characteristics on the incidence of
website defacements in that country.
To frame our study, we draw on the routine activities framework because it has
been used to explain macro-level variations in victimization patterns in the physical
world and in cyberspace (Holt et al. 2018). Stated simply, routine activity theory (RAT)
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proposes that victimization results from the convergence of motivated offenders, suitable
targets, and the absence of capable guardianship in time and space.
Combining the Zone-H data with other macro-level data allowed for an
examination of the predictive efficacy of theoretically derived variables on country-level
victimization frequency. In addition, we were able to examine these relationships across
hackers’ valuations of potential targets. We used this distinction as an approximation for
target suitability (namely value) and examined whether political defacements have
different predictive factors than recreational defacements across nations. We
hypothesized that capable guardianship will decrease website defacement frequency
across nations, and that target suitability will increase website defacement frequency
across nations. Drawing from Clarke (1999), we suspect that hackers do not view all
targets as equally suitable. Target criteria for political defacements likely differs from the
target criteria for recreational defacements. Therefore, we seek to answer the following
research question: Do the country-level correlates of website defacement vary based on
hackers’ valuations of target suitability?
Theoretical Background
Website Defacement
Website defacement originated as a way for hackers to mock system
administrators for poor security protocol, and as a way to generate their reputations as
skilled hackers (Kilger 2011; Woo et al. 2004). Today, website defacement is commonly
used to protest social and political injustice around the globe, where hacktivists often rely
on website defacement to spread their ideological messages to a wider audience (Maimon
et al. 2017; Fitri 2011). Although over one million websites were defaced in 2017 alone,
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the existing literature virtually ignores the correlates of victimization, focusing almost
exclusively on the content of the defacements (Holt et al. 2017; Zone-H 2018).
For example, analyzing the content of 462 defaced websites, Woo and colleagues
(2004) concluded that 70% were classified as pranks, while the rest were politically
motivated. Furthermore, they found that politically motivated hackers post more
aggressive content than those who primarily attack for fun. Additionally, politically
motivated hackers are more likely to deface websites following real-world political
events (Al-Rizzo 2008; Denning 2011; Kilger 2011), and during times of war (Geers
2008), suggesting that structural factors may influence patterns of website defacement
victimization. Relatedly, Maimon and colleagues (2017) observed that hackers tend to
use social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to spread their ideology and
build their reputation. Also, web-defacers who use social media platforms generate
higher frequency of website defacement attacks than hackers who do not.
Holt and colleagues (2017) examined the attitudinal and behavioral correlates of
the willingness to deface websites using a college student sample. They found that
definitions favorable to cybercrime and attitudes in support of marginalized groups
predicted individuals’ willingness to deface websites, while technological skill and
involvement in cybercrime did not. Although providing insight into the correlates of
website defacement, the study’s findings were limited because the authors used a
scenario design to gauge motivation. Scenario designs have been successfully used in
criminology but have notable shortcomings. Because Holt et al. (2017) asked subjects to
pretend they had “necessary skills” to orchestrate the attack, it is likely that hackers who
engage in website defacement differ from these college students in their knowledge about
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website defacement. Consequently, the process of learning how to hack may affect the
motivation to conduct defacement. Therefore, to gain a more complete understanding of
how and why offenders choose their victims, researchers should employ samples of
active offenders.
In addition to using appropriate samples, researchers should employ theory to
explain website defacement. Not only can criminological theory be used to explain
cybercrime, cybercrime can be used to further develop criminological theory (Maimon
and Lounderback 2019). For example, Ooi and colleagues (2012) found that website
defacers are “variety seeking,” meaning they attack domains around the world. Moreover,
website defacers choose their victims based on the underlying reason for the attack rather
than choosing those close in proximity. Although the authors attribute variety-seeking
behavior to boredom, a rival hypothesis could be offered: victimization results from the
structural characteristics of the country where the domain is hosted. Given that website
defacement is used to protest social and political injustice (Holt et al. 2017), it is
plausible a country’s political and economic structure influences website defacement
victimization. Hackers may therefore value targets based on country-level characteristics
(Ooi et al. 2012). To ground Ooi et al.’s empirical finding in a theoretical frame, Cohen
and Felson’s (1979) RAT offers a way to explore these assertions. Accordingly, we used
this theory to frame our examination of the global variation in website defacements.
Routine Activity Theory
RAT was originally formulated by Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson (1979)
to explain increased burglary rates in post-World War II society. Routine activity theory,
unlike most mainstream criminological theories, is a theory of victimization that focuses
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on ecological conditions. Additionally, RAT is not concerned with individual
characteristics, but rather the situational and structural dimensions conducive to
victimization. Stated simply, the base premise of RAT is that societal changes in post-war
daily routines connected motivated offenders with suitable targets while simultaneously
limiting the availability of capable guardianship. This convergence of the three elements
in time and place then causes crime.
Even when motivated offenders come across targets, however, the offenders must
view the potential target as suitable, which depends on their motivational reasoning about
its worth. In other words, not all targets are equally suitable to all offenders. Clarke
(1999), argued stolen products are typically concealable, removable, available, valuable,
enjoyable, and disposable, which makes up the acronym CRAVED. For these reasons,
burglars often elect to steal small electronic devices rather than refrigerators, or other
bulky items. For offline theft, value is typically related to the pecuniary worth of an
object making it universally appealing as a suitable target.
CRAVED does not apply perfectly to cyberspace, but it makes evident that target
suitability varies based on the criminals’ valuations of a product or target. In the case of
website defacement, the value of the target might depend on the motivated offenders’
judgement of the website’s symbolic importance. For political defacements, a website’s
sponsor, or the organization associated with the site, may be valuable. Far-left extremists,
for example, deface websites belonging to businesses they deem unethical (e.g. furriers,
animal laboratories, construction companies) (Holt et al. 2019). Recreational hackers,
instead, might find website content less valuable as they prize the accumulation of
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defacements to demonstrate their influence (Holt 2007). This notion of differential target
valuation in cyberspace, however, is underdeveloped.
Despite this underdevelopment, RAT is often regarded a general theory of crime
(Ngo and Paternoster 2011), and it has been used to explain a host of victimization
patterns in both the physical world (Cohen and Felson 1979) and in cyberspace (Maimon
and Lounderback 2019), at both the macro- (Kigerl 2012) and individual-levels (Holt and
Bossler 2013). However, the relevance of RAT to various forms of cybercrime has
sparked a criminological debate. Based on the premise that cyberspace is “anti-spatial”
(Mitchell 1995, 8) and lacks temporal ordering, Yar (2005) argued that the “spatiotemporal ontologies” of virtual and non-virtual environments are distinctly different
(p.414). Yar asserted motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of a capable
guardian could not converge in cyberspace in the same manner that was hypothesized by
Cohen and Felson (1979). Reyns and colleagues (2011), however, convincingly argued
convergence is made possible via networked systems. In other words, victims and
offenders still converge regardless of their physical locations.
Most tests of RAT in cyberspace have found moderate support (Maimon and
Louderback 2019). For example, capable guardianship decreases the likelihood of data
loss (Bossler and Holt 2009), malware infection (Holt and Bossler 2013), and hacking
victimization (Wilsem 2013); whereas, time spent online increases one’s likelihood of
experiencing various forms of cyber victimization (Leukfeldt and Yar 2016; Reynes
2015; Yucedal 2010). At the macro-level, Maimon and colleagues (2013) found that
cyber-attacks against university networks are more likely to occur during business hours.
The authors attributed this finding to the increased visibility and accessibility of potential
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suitable targets. Similarly, Kigerl (2012) found that wealthier nations (as a result of target
suitability) experience higher amounts of phishing and spam. Lastly, Holt and colleagues
(2018) found that countries with greater technological infrastructure, more political
freedom, and less organized crime are more likely to report malware infections. Taken
together, these studies show RAT to be useful in explaining cybercrime victimization
patterns.
Although these studies find support for the three main concepts of RAT
(motivated offenders, suitability of targets, and capability of guardianship), they do not
measure specifically what makes a target suitable or what makes a guardian capable.
Cohen and Felson (1979, 595) did break down target suitability into four components
(value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility), but most tests lack the data to empirically
parse out the components of the concept. This is a common issue with tests of the theory
for both traditional crimes and cybercrimes (Holt et al. 2018).
With regard to cybercrime specifically, Yar (2005) discussed the various
components of RAT. With respect to the value of suitable targets in cyberspace, Yar
(2005, 419) noted:
Broadly speaking, we can conclude that the targets of cybercrime, like
those of terrestrial crime, vary widely and attract different valuations,
and that such valuations are likely to impact on the suitability of the
target when viewed from the standpoint of a potential offender…
In the case of website defacement, hackers might select websites based on their
own valuation of the potential targets. For example, script kiddies attempting entry into
elite hacker circles might value any accessible website as they build their CVs with
volume of increasingly difficult hacks (Holt 2007). Hacktivists, on the other hand, might
only value websites with political, religious, or economic significance (Romagna and van
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den Hout 2017). Finally, ethical hackers might value poorly guarded systems as a means
to identify and call out careless cybersecurity practices. The variation in target selection
should therefore affect the way other RAT constructs predict victimization. Few tests of
RAT, especially in cyberspace, have measured target suitability, assuming all digital
information is equally valuable to hackers. In particular to website defacement, the value
of the target depends on the offenders’ perceived worth in building reputation and status,
or as a symbol of thwarting oppression.
In addition, prior research suggests that other country-level structural variables
may affect various forms of cybercrime victimization, including website defacement.
Computer vulnerabilities embody Cohen and Felson’s (1979) original operational
definition of target suitability, namely accessibility. A vulnerability is a weakness or flaw
that can be exploited to allow a hacker illegitimate access to a computer system. Hackers
can exploit vulnerable systems with ease to deface websites and spread their ideological
message. Therefore, countries with more vulnerabilities should experience more website
defacements.
In addition to computer vulnerabilities, other characteristics have been shown to
increase cybercrime victimization at different units of analysis. For example, Holt and
colleagues (2018) argue that Asian nations likely report more malware due to the
“prominence of hacker communities” (1727) and the substantial pool of potential victims
with high-speed Internet access. In this vein, Asian nations should experience higher rates
of various forms of cybercrime, including website defacement, due to increased visibility
and accessibility in cyberspace.
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Moreover, a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), commitment to educational
attainment, and level of freedom are positively associated with the amount of time spent
online and the sophistication of the Internet infrastructure within the nation (Holt et al.
2018). Multiple studies have reported that time spent engaging in online leisure activities
is associated with an increased risk of victimization (Maimon and Louderback 2019).
This is likely because increased Internet traffic increases the visibility and accessibility of
potential targets, thus making them more suitable (Wang et al. 2015). At the macro-level,
Maimon and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that attack frequency is greater when more
people are online. Wealthy, educated, and free countries are at an increased risk of being
attacked because more of their citizens have Internet browsing capabilities and because
the country is more equipped to host websites. Since cybercrime tends to be
geographically clustered (Maimon et al. 2015), and since website defacement can only be
launched against countries that host websites, it is likely that GDP, commitment to
educational attainment, and level of freedom will increase website defacement frequency
by increasing visibility and accessibility.
The presence of certain characteristics, however, likely have an adverse effect of
cybercrime victimization. Muslim majority countries and countries that prioritize societal
well-being, for example, are perhaps less likely to be targets of various forms of
cybercrime such as website defacements. If target suitability increases crime rates,
unsuitable targets should have the opposite effect. As discussed above, website
defacement is often used as a form of social and political protest. Many of these
protestors are pro-Islamic (Choo 2008); therefore, it is likely these protestors find less
value in defacing Muslim majority countries. Although there is a likelihood that tensions
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across countries influence mutual targeting, given that many defacers are pro-Islamic we
expect that Muslim majority nations will less frequently be targeted by website
defacement.
Similarly, countries that prioritize societal well-being should be viewed as less
suitable. One way to assess the prioritization of societal well-being is through the
existence of social programs, such as healthcare (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997). If a
country prioritizes societal well-being, protestors will likely find less value in defacing
their websites.
Capable guardianship is the other essential part of the RAT equation (Cohen and
Felson 1978). Computer emergency response teams (CERT) operate around the world
and serve as first responders to various forms of cyber-victimization (i.e. hacking,
viruses, malware). In addition, they disseminate information that can be used to prevent
victimization (Holt 2003; Wall 2007). Therefore, as suggested by Holt et al. (2018), the
presence of a CERT should decrease the frequency of various forms of cybercrime
victimization, such as website defacement, at the country-level. Another measure of
guardianship is cyber defense through a country’s military. Lynn (2010, 63) noted cyber
defense is “…just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space”. It is
believed that a strong military presence will be seen as a capable guardian by hackers,
especially with regard to critical infrastructure (Kugler 2009). Therefore, a strong
military presence should be associated with a decrease in website defacement frequency.
Current Study
The current study can be viewed as an assessment of the predictive ability of
theoretical constructs drawn from RAT on website defacement frequency across nations,
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and an investigation into how the influence of structural characteristics of website
defacement victimization vary based on hackers’ valuations of potential targets. To
conduct this investigation, we first test the predicative ability of RAT derived variables
on total website defacement frequency across nations. We then examine the effects of the
country-level structural variables on two substantively different forms of website
defacement: political and recreational. We focus exclusively on these two types of
defacements because they are the most prevalent and distinctly different (Woo et al.
2004). In essence, we seek to test the predictive ability of RAT proxies on total website
defacement frequency, and determine if, and how, the structural characteristics conducive
to website defacement victimization vary based on offenders’ valuations of potential
targets.
We first hypothesize that the presence of capable guardianship will decrease
website defacement frequency across nations. Specifically, a strong military presence and
the presence of a CERT should be associated with a decrease in website defacement
frequency across nations. Computer emergency response teams serve as first responders
to various cyber-attacks and can be used to prevent victimization (Holt 2003; Wall 2007).
Military presence, through cyber defense tactics, has shown to have a deterrent effect on
attacks against critical infrastructure (Lynn 2010). Both CERT and military presence
should deter attacks against websites across nations due to the increased risk of
punishment and increased difficultly of infiltration (target hardening).
At the same time, we hypothesize that the presence of suitable targets will
increase website defacement frequency across nations. Specifically, computer
vulnerabilities, GDP, commitment to educational attainment, political freedom, and being
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an Asian nation should be associated with an increase in attack frequency across nations,
while Muslim majority nations, and nations that prioritize societal well-being should
experience less defacements. Vulnerabilities are easily exploited by hackers; therefore,
countries with more vulnerabilities are more accessible to those wishing to deface a
website. Prior research has found that Asian nations report more cybercrime due to the
sheer number of potential victims that reside within close proximity to hacker
communities (Holt et al. 2018). In this vein, Asian nations should experience higher
frequencies of website defacement due to increased visibility and accessibility of the
websites hosted in Asia. Moreover, a country’s GDP, commitment to educational
attainment, and level of freedom are positively associated with the amount of time spent
online and a nation’s Internet infrastructure (Holt et al. 2018), which increases the
visibility and accessibility of potential targets. In other words, nations with more
websites, and more citizens accessing those websites, likely receive more website
defacements as a result.
Muslim majority countries and countries that prioritize societal well-being are
likely deemed as less suitable, and therefore should experience fewer website
defacements. Although there may be retaliation targeted toward Muslim majority
countries, we expect that these attacks will be less frequent decreasing the presence of
defacements in Muslim majority countries. Similarly, if a country prioritizes societal
well-being, protestors will likely find less value in defacing websites hosted in that
country.
As stated above, not all targets are equally suitable to all offenders. Political
hackers likely valuate potential targets differently than recreational hackers. In other
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words, attacks launched recreationally are likely influenced by a country’s
characteristics; whereas political defacements are likely target specific (Romagna and van
den Hout 2017). For these reasons, we ask the following research question. Do the
country-level correlates of website defacement vary based on hackers’ valuations of
target suitability? Specifically, we seek to determine if, and how, the structural correlates
of political defacement differ from the structural correlates of recreational defacement.
Methods
To test our hypotheses and answer our research question, we collected data from a
variety of different sources including Zone-H (zone-h.org), the United States’ Central
Intelligence Agency (cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook), Freedom House
(freedomhouse.org), Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams or FIRST
(first.org), and Kaspersky Lab (kaspersky.com). Our final sample consisted of 114
nations in 2017. We focus our analysis on website defacement victimization at the
country-level.
Dependent Variable: Website Defacement
Zone-H was created in 2002 to archive defaced websites. Hackers report their
successful defacements to Zone-H, and after the defacement is verified, it is permanently
housed in their archive. Over 13 million defacements have been reported to Zone-H thus
far. In addition to archiving defaced websites, Zone-H provides attack specific
information. Relevant to the current study, Zone-H reports the target location, selfreported offense motivation, and attack date. They also classify some website
defacements as “special,” which they vaguely define as attacks on “important websites”
(Zone-H 2018). Although the special defacements are loosely defined, this distinction
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allows us to focus our attention on attacks against higher value targets. It is important to
note that the large majority of these special defacements are attacks against government
websites. An analysis of the non-special, common defacements might therefore show
different findings.
Using the Zone-H archive, we gathered the total number of special defacements
that occurred in 2017. We then calculated the total number of special defacements
launched against each country in 2017. Additionally, we calculated the total number of
these special defacements that were classified as political or recreational2, then calculated
the total number of political or recreational defacements that occurred at the countrylevel. We therefore have three distinct dependent variables to examine variation in
country-level website defacement incidents: total website defacements, recreational
defacements, and political defacements.
As made clear in the above paragraph, the current study employs population data
of all special defacements that were reported to Zone-h in 2017. In total, nearly 13,000
special defacements were reported to Zone-h in 2017. We focus on attacks that occurred
in 2017 because it was, at the time of writing, the most recent year of data available on
Zone-h. We believe restricting our analysis to a recent year is beneficial. It is likely the
correlates of website defacement in contemporary times are different than they were in
earlier years.
Capable Guardianship
Capable guardianship at the country-level is operationalized as the presence of a
CERT (i.e. Holt et al. 2018) and a strong military presence (i.e. Lynn 2010). Using data

Recreational defacements, for the purpose of the current study, are defacements Zone-h lists as “just for
fun”.
2
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gathered from FIRST (an organization that gathers data on CERTs around the world), we
created a dummy variable for CERT presence. We measured military presence using
percent GDP spent on military expenditures, which was collected from the CIA World
Fact Book (an almanac-style resource that provides information on countries around the
world).
Target Suitability
Drawing from prior research, we employed multiple measures of target suitability.
To measure country-level vulnerability, we gathered the total number of vulnerabilities
per day, per country, as reported by Kaspersky Lab (a multi-national cybersecurity
company) for a period of six months in 2018. We then took the mean number of
vulnerabilities for each country to ensure that our final measure minimizes the influence
of random fluctuation.
We used The CIA World Fact Book to gather data for the following variables:
GDP, commitment to educational attainment, prioritization of societal well-being, and
Muslim majority. GDP is measured using a country’s total gross domestic product.
Commitment to educational attainment is measured by percent GDP spent toward
education. We created a dummy variable for Muslim majority countries (i.e. countries
with over 50% of their total population being Muslim). Societal well-being was measured
as percent GDP spent on healthcare.
To measure a country’s level of political freedom, we employed a freedom scale
that was calculated by Freedom House (an independent nongovernmental agency), which
ranks countries based on their citizens’ political freedoms and civil liberties. Higher
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scores indicate higher levels of freedom. Lastly, drawing from prior research (Holt et al.
2018), we created a dummy variable for Asian nations.
Analytic Strategy
We employ negative binomial models because our dependent variables were
skewed count measures. In addition, the defacement variables’ variances were greater
than the means indicating overdispersion, which renders the commonly used Poisson
regression problematic. Negative binominal regression, however, allows for the
assessment of overdispersed count data.
Furthermore, because our dependent variables are measured as a count, rather
than a rate, we considered country-level exposure to victimization. Countries with more
Internet users likely received a greater number of website defacements simply because
more opportunity existed. Count models account for the difference in opportunity by
adding an exposure variable into the model and constraining the coefficient to one. We
used the number of Internet users (collected from the CIA World Fact Book) as our
exposure variable. Stated simply, the count (of website defacements) is adjusted based on
opportunity (number of Internet users), which allows for a non-biased assessment of the
data.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our sample. As shown in the table, there
was an average of about 70 (SD=304.67) special defacements in each country in 2017,
and a substantial variation in total attack frequency. Recreational defacements (M=67.42,
SD=171.68) occur more frequently than political defacements (M=3.38, SD=13.79)3.

3

Of the 184 countries we gathered data for in 2017, 71% reported at least one special defacement.
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This variation shows that some countries are frequently targeted, whereas others receive
fewer attacks.4 Additionally, the fact that recreational defacements occur more frequently
than political defacements, could be viewed as preliminary evidence that political hackers
are more selective of their target.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
To examine the effects of a country’s Internet infrastructure and socioeconomic
characteristics on website defacement frequency, we employed a negative binominal
model. Results attained from this analysis, reported in Table 2, provide partial support for
RAT. In regard to capable guardianship in cyberspace, both CERT and Military operate
in the anticipated direction, but only Military attained statistical significance (b = -211,
p=0.006).
Target suitability was measured using multiple proxies. Specifically, we
hypothesized that the number of known vulnerabilities, Asian countries, GDP,
commitment to educational attainment, and level of freedom would be associated with an
increased number of website defacements, whereas Muslim majority countries and
countries that prioritize societal well-being would experience less defacements. All of our
measures operate in the hypothesized direction, but only Vulnerability (b=0.001,
p=0.009), Asian (b=1.755, p=0.000), Muslim (b=-1.030, p=0.015), and Health (b=-0.258,
p=0.003) attained statistical significance.
Incident rate ratios (IRR) provide an intuitive way to assess effect magnitude.
Although statistically significant, the effect size of Vulnerability (IRR=1.000) is
practically equivalent to the null value. Asian nations (IRR=5.782), however, are nearly

4

A check of the variance inflation factor indicated no problem with multicollinearity.
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six times more likely to experience an increase in the count of website defacements than
non-Asian nations. Muslim majority countries are nearly three times less likely to
experience defacements than non-Muslim majority nations (IRR=0.357). The effect size
of Health (IRR=0.772) and Military (IRR=0.810) are moderate to low.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To understand how structural characteristics vary across hackers’ valuations of
potential targets, we examine the frequency of political and recreational defacements. As
reported in Table 3, structural characteristics still have an effect on website defacement
frequency when looking at defacements conducted recreationally. In regard to capable
guardianship, Military still has a deterrent effect (b=-0.644, p=0.000). In addition,
Vulnerability (0.001, p=0.030) and Asian (b=2.159, p=0.000) remained statistically
significant. The effect size of Vulnerability is still about zero (IRR=1.000), but Asian
nations (IRR=8.664) are now over eight times more likely to have an increase in counts
than their non-Asian counterparts.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Next, we examined political defacement frequency. None of our predictor
variables attained statistical significance. Military no longer has a deterrent effect, Asian
nations are not more likely to be attacked, and the effect of vulnerability disappeared.
Results reported in Table 4 show that political defacements, in the context of the current
study, are not influenced by measures of a country’s Internet infrastructure and
socioeconomic characteristics.
In the interest of testing the significance of the difference between the statistically
significant coefficients presented in Table 3 and their non-significant counterparts in
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Table 4 we examined the equality of regression coefficients using the formula suggested
by Paternoster et al. (1998). The effect of military presence is signficantly different
across groups (z=-3.00), whereas the effects of vulnerability and Asian are invariant.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Discussion
Routine activity theory posits that crime occurs when a motivated offender,
suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian converge in time and space (Cohen
and Felson 1979). Historically, many tests of RAT have not specifically measured the sub
domains of target suitability (VIVA). We argue, however, that value can be measured
through the choice in targets. By analogy, burglars and arsonists likely evaluate the value
of a target differently. The burglar, as stated by Cohen and Felson (1979), may elect to
steal an electronic device rather than a refrigerator because it is more portable and easily
converted to cash. An arsonist, however, cannot be influenced by the same factors as the
burglar because their evaluation criteria for target suitability are different. Thus the target
value for the arsonist can be judged in the kind of buildings he burns. In the same vein,
political hackers likely evaluate the worth of a target differently than recreational
hackers. Political hackers likely have a narrow view of target suitability; whereas
recreational hackers have a wider selection of targets to choose from. For the purpose of
the current study, we viewed recreational defacements and political defacements as
separate types of offenses. Although the modus operandi can be similar, if not the same,
past research has shown the attacks are substantively different (Woo et al., 2004).
The current study sought to assess the predictive ability of RAT derived variables
on website defacement frequency, and attempted to determine if, and how, structural
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characteristics conducive to website defacement vary based on hackers’ valuations of
potential targets. Specifically, using country-level victimization data, we examined the
macro-level correlates of total website defacement frequency, recreational defacement
frequency, and political defacement frequency. We found that a country’s structural
characteristics influence the number of total defacements and defacements conducted for
recreational reasons but found no evidence that political defacement frequency is
influenced by other macro-level variables.
More specifically, total website defacement frequency is deterred by capable
guardianship (a strong military) and influenced by a few measures of target suitability
(Vulnerability, Asian, Muslim, and Health). Hackers likely attack countries with known
vulnerabilities because vulnerabilities make it easier to infiltrate and deface websites.
Asian countries are likely targeted due to the prominent hacker communities that reside
in Asia and the sheer number of potential targets. Therefore, it is our belief that
victimization is more prevalent in Asian nations due to increased visibility and
accessibility. Majority Muslim countries and countries that prioritize societal well-being
receive fewer website defacements. Website defacement is used to protest events around
the globe (Holt et al. 2017). A large number of these protestors are pro-Islamic (Choo
2008). Perhaps countries that prioritize societal well-being and Muslim majority
countries are deemed as less suitable by those who engage in website defacement for
altruistic reasons.
Regarding recreational defacements, structural characteristics still had an effect.
A strong military still had a deterrent effect and known vulnerabilities still increased
attack frequency across nations. Asian countries suffered from a greater likelihood of
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victimization when the attack was recreational. This is likely a result of hacker rivalries
that exist in Asia that are country specific (Pinkston 2016). Muslim majority nations and
the prioritization of societal well-being, however, no longer had a statistically significant
effect. Recreational hackers may not care about a country’s prioritization of societal wellbeing or their citizens’ faith; they might attack for sheer enjoyment and to build a
reputation as a skilled hacker (Kilger 2011).
Political defacement frequency was not influenced by a country’s socioeconomic
characteristics or Internet infrastructure. As stated above, political motivation can be used
as an approximation for target suitability. Political attacks are not opportunistic, but
rather target specific. In other words, those hacking for political reasons may be driven by
their evaluation of a target’s value, and unfazed by the presence of a capable guardian or
the other elements of target suitability (i.e. inertia, visibility, accessibility). Politically
motivated attacks are common in India and Pakistan (Rasool 2015). It is possible these
hackers are solely driven by the ongoing conflict over Kashmir making these countries
more vulnerable to politically motivated website defacement.
These politically motivated hackers may operate like politically motivated
terrorists in the physical world (Holt et al. 2019). Terrorism research has demonstrated
that typical deterrence strategies have less utility than other forms of deterrence (i.e.
reintegrative punishment strategy) (Ginges 2007). Therefore, a more multidimensional
approach may be warranted if policy makers wish to deter this type of attack.
The findings presented in the current study provide partial support for RAT. Total
website defacement frequency was deterred by capable guardianship (a strong military)
and influenced by multiple measures of target suitability (Vulnerability, Asian, Muslim,
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and Health). Interestingly, we found that the structural characteristics conducive to
website defacement vary across hackers’ self-reported valuations of the attacked website.
This study, like most, suffers from notable limitations. Data for our dependent
variables were gathered from Zone-H. Zone-H only includes reported website
defacements. It is likely, and even probable, that those who report their defacements to
Zone-H differ from those who choose not to report. In addition, due to data availability,
we were only able to include 114 countries in our regression models due to missing data
across datasets.5 Although this is on par with previous research (e.g. Messner and
Rosenfeld 1997), future studies should attempt to include all countries in their analysis.
We only included special defacements that occurred in 2017. Although nearly 13,000
special defacements occurred in 2017, this choice limits the generalizability of our
findings. However, it did allow us to focus our analysis on recent attacks on higher value
targets. In the future, researchers may want to include non-special defacements and
defacements that occurred in other years.
Additionally, we relied on hackers’ self-reported motivations through the Zone-H
website, which offers a variety of motivations to choose from when hackers log their
attack. This measure is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. A content analysis
examining hackers’ self-reported motivations and defacement content should be used to
validate the measure. Lastly, we operationalize hackers’ self-reported motivations as an
approximation for target suitability, namely value. We believe this decision is justified in
that motivation to attack a specific target is an evaluation of that target’s value; however,
we were unable to assess individual hacker rationale. Future studies should consider a

5

Most of the countries missing data were small island nations, but there were a few large developing
countries that were also excluded (e.g., North Korea).
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mixed methodological approach to gain a more nuanced understanding of the
phenomenon.
Although we draw from RAT, the current study cannot be considered a true test
of the theory. Instead, we test the predictive efficacy of theoretically derived variables.
Although the presence of a CERT and a strong military establish face validity, it is
unclear whether these measures are truly indicative of capable guardianship at the
country-level. Any private or public organization can have a CERT; therefore, it may be a
better measure of capable guardianship at a smaller scale. If CERTs are only capable
guardians at the organizational level, this would explain why neither Holt et al. (2018),
nor the current study, found the presence of a CERT to have a deterrent effect. Although
military presence is statistically significant, and in the anticipated direction, it is likely
that other governmental measures would be more effective. For example, the existence of
policy created to curtail attacks against a country would likely have a stronger effect than
military presence. Additionally, although our measures of target suitability do not
indicate signs of multicollinearity, they may be theoretically correlated. We include GDP,
freedom, and education as independent variables in our model, but they may work
together, or with other variables not included in our model, to form a latent variable that
serves as a better measure of target suitability. Future studies should work to better
understand how the components of RAT operate at different levels of measurement and
attempt to identify theoretically sound constructs that serve as better proxies for target
suitability and capable guardianship in cyberspace.
Despite these limitations, our findings have both real world and theoretical
implications. Both capable guardianship and target suitability impact defacement
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frequency. If country-level policies aimed to increase guardianship or decrease any of the
components of target suitability (value, inertia, visibility, accessibility) are implemented,
perhaps defacement frequency will decline; however, these policies may prove
ineffective for deterring political hackers. A multi-dimensional approach, similar to those
used for politically motivated terrorists in the physical world, may prove more effective
(Ginges 2007). Additionally, although this test was conducted at the country-level, microlevel policies can be inferred. Specifically, those who host websites might have the
ability to protect their site from potential defacers by ensuring their website does not
suffer from exploitable vulnerabilities.
Regarding theory, the current study expands the scope of RAT to website
defacement, a form of cybercrime largely ignored by criminologists. In addition, this is
the first known study to examine variation in macro-level crime correlates across
hackers’ self-reported valuations of a specific target. By using hackers’ motivations as an
approximation for target suitability, we were able to examine how country-level
correlates vary based on hackers’ valuations. Results from the current study provide
partial support for RAT. Specifically, we found that website defacements are less likely
to occur in the presence of capable guardianship (strong military presence) and more
likely to occur when certain measures of target suitability are present. These patterns of
victimization lend additional support to the premise that hackers are rational actors
(Maimon et al. 2014). In addition, our findings suggest that although a country’s
socioeconomic characteristics and Internet infrastructure are related to website
defacement frequency, the correlates of victimization vary based on hackers’ perceived
valuations of potential targets. Recreational defacements are deterred by capable
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guardianship (strong military presence) and are influenced by certain measures of target
suitability while political defacements are not.
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Variable
Total
Defacement
Recreational
Defacement

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Country Data.
Observations Mean
Standard
Minimum
Deviation
184
69.47
304.67
0
184

67.42

171.68

0

Maximum
2783
1748

32

Political
Defacement
CERT

184

3.38

13.79

0

111

184

0.49

0.50

0

1

Military

148

2.02

1.90

0.10

13.73

Vulnerability 143

1620.09

5083.59

4.50

36737

Asian

184

0.26

0.44

0

1

GDP

178

21473.60

22648.61

700

124900

Education

149

4.81

2.01

0.60

13

Freedom

176

56.85

29.95

-1

100

Muslim

184

0.27

0.44

0

1

Health

168

6.67

2.53

1.50

17.10

Table 2. Assessing the Macro-Level Correlates of Website Defacement Using a Negative
Binomial Regression (n=114).
Total Defacement b
IRR
s.e.
p
Capable
Guardianship
CERT

-0.099

0.906

0.323

0.759
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Military

-0.211

0.810

0.077

0.006

Vulnerability

0.001

1.000

0.000

0.009

Asian

1.755

5.782

0.436

0.000

GDP

2.560

1.000

8.810

0.771

Education

0.012

1.013

0.100

0.900

Freedom

0.012

1.012

0.008

0.131

Muslim

-1.030

0.357

0.423

0.015

Health

-0.258

0.772

0.087

0.003

Internet Users

1

Target Suitability

(exposure)

Log Likelihood=-426.285; Pseudo R2=0.053

Table 3. Assessing the Macro-Level Correlates of Recreational Website Defacement
Using a Negative Binomial Regression (N=114).
Recreational
b
IRR
s.e.
p
Defacement
Capable
Guardianship
CERT
0.562
1.754
0.390
0.150
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Military

-0.644

0.524

0.156

0.000

Vulnerability

0.001

1.000

0.001

0.030

Asian

2.159

8.664

0.469

0.000

GDP

9.450

1.000

9.160

0.302

Education

-0.033

0.967

0.124

0.788

Freedom

0.012

1.011

0.009

0.199

Muslim

-0.899

0.407

0.498

0.071

Health

-0.177

0.838

0.115

0.124

Internet Users

1

Target Suitability

(exposure)

Log Likelihood=-322.243; Pseudo R2=0.083

Table 4. Assessing the Macro-Level Correlates of “Political” Website Defacement Using
a Negative Binomial Regression (N=114).
Political
b
IRR
s.e.
P
Defacement
Capable
Guardianship
CERT
0.340
1.405
0.604
0.573
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Military

-0.038

0.962

0.128

0.763

Vulnerability

0.001

1.000

0.000

0.283

Asian

1.028

2.800

0.673

0.127

GDP

5.100

1.000

0.001

0.971

Education

0.148

1.160

0.171

0.386

Freedom

-0.001

0.999

0.014

0.930

Muslim

-0.610

0.543

0.717

0.394

Health

-0.236

0.790

0.181

0.192

Internet Users

1

Target Suitability

(exposure)

Log Likelihood=-158.159; Pseudo R2=0.030
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